Disclosure and choice by Ben-Porath, Elchanan et al.
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
BU Open Access Articles BU Open Access Articles
2018-07
Disclosure and choice
This work was made openly accessible by BU Faculty. Please share how this access benefits you.
Your story matters.
Version
Citation (published version): Elchanan Ben-Porath, Eddie Dekel, Barton L. Lipman. 2018.
"Disclosure and Choice." The Review of Economic Studies, Volume
85, Issue 3, 1 July 2018, Pages 1471–1501.
https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdx064
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/40543
Boston University
Disclosure and Choice1
Elchanan Ben-Porath 2 Eddie Dekel 3 Barton L. Lipman4
First Draft
December 2014
Current Draft
October 2017
1We thank Rick Green, Mark Machina, Phil Reny, various seminar audiences, and Botond
Koszegi and three anonymous referees for helpful comments and the National Science Founda-
tion, grant SES–0820333 (Dekel), and the US–Israel Binational Science Foundation for support
for this research.
2Department of Economics and Center for Rationality, Hebrew University. Email: benpo-
rat@math.huji.ac.il.
3Economics Department, Northwestern University, and School of Economics, Tel Aviv Uni-
versity. Email: dekel@northwestern.edu.
4Department of Economics, Boston University. Email: blipman@bu.edu.
Abstract
An agent chooses among projects with random outcomes. His payoff is increasing
in the outcome and in an observer’s expectation of the outcome. With some probabil-
ity, the agent will be able to disclose some information about the true outcome to the
observer. We show that choice is inefficient in general. We illustrate this point with a
characterization of the inefficiencies that result when the agent can perfectly disclose the
outcome with some probability and can disclose nothing otherwise as in Dye (1985a).
In this case, the agent favors riskier projects even with lower expected returns. On the
other hand, if information can also be disclosed by a challenger who prefers lower beliefs
of the observer, the chosen project is excessively risky when the agent has better access
to information, excessively risk–averse when the challenger has better access, and effi-
cient otherwise. We also characterize the agent’s worst–case equilibrium payoff. We give
examples of alternative disclosure technologies illustrating other forms the inefficiencies
can take. For example, in a two–dimensional setting, we demonstrate a “hitting for the
fences” effect where the agent systematically focuses on the “harder” dimension at the
expense of success on the easier.
1 Introduction
Consider an agent who makes productive decisions and also decisions about how much to
disclose about the outcomes of these choices. The productive decisions are not observed
directly and the outcome is only observed after some delay. The agent’s payoff depends
on the outcome of the productive decisions but also on the beliefs of an observer regarding
the outcome prior to its observation. We give several examples of this situation below.
Intuitively, the agent’s control of information flows gives him an incentive to deviate
from efficient productive decisions. For example, he may engage in excessive risk–taking.
After all, he can (at least to some extent for some period of time) hide bad outcomes
and disclose only good ones. This creates an option value which encourages risk–taking.
More broadly, he has an incentive to make production choices that are more likely to
give him an opportunity to disclose information that makes him look good even if these
choices are less likely to generate good outcomes.
We show that this incentive harms the agent in the sense that he would be better off
if he had no control over information. The reason is that the agent has an incentive to
try to choose a project that makes the outcome look better than it is. In equilibrium,
though, the observer cannot be fooled, so the agent simply hurts himself.
To illustrate these effects of strategic disclosure, we model disclosure as in Dye (1985a):
with some probability the agent can disclose the exact realization and otherwise cannot
disclose anything. We show that under these conditions, the agent would be better off if
he could not affect disclosure. More specifically, with any disclosure process under which
the probability that information is disclosed is independent of the information being
disclosed, the payoff to the agent is the expected value of the project with the highest
expected value.1 We refer to this payoff as the first best. In contrast, when the agent has
control of disclosure, he has an incentive to engage in excessive risk–taking, leading to a
utility loss relative to the first best which can be “large” in a sense to be made precise.
We now give examples of this setting.
First, consider the manager of a firm. His actions determine a probability distribution
over the firm’s profits. In the short run, he can choose to release privately observed
information about profits. The observer is the stock market whose beliefs about the
firm’s profits determine the stock price of the firm. The manager’s payoff is a convex
combination of the short–run and long–run stock price, where the latter is the realized
profits — the true value of the firm. Here the first–best project is the one which maximizes
the expected value of the firm.
1For example, if all information that can be disclosed is disclosed (e.g., due to mandatory disclosure
requirements), then the disclosure process satisfies this assumption.
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One way to interpret this model is to assume that a typical stockholder in the firm has
a liquidity shock with some probability which forces him to sell his share. If not forced to
sell, the stockholder will have the same information as the market about the value of the
stock and so will be indifferent between selling or holding his share. Suppose for simplicity
that he always holds his share in this event. Then if the manager chooses actions to
maximize the stockholders expected utility, he will maximize a convex combination of
the short-run stock price and the realized profits. In that sense, we can reinterpret this
example as assuming that the manager acts to maximize the utility of a representative
stockholder. Thus the inefficiency we identify is not due to the textbook moral hazard
problem (e.g., Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995), Chapter 14).
Second, suppose the agent is an incumbent politician and the observer is a represen-
tative voter. The productive activity chosen by the incumbent is a policy which affects
the utility of the voter. Before the outcome of the policy is observed, the incumbent
comes up for reelection. As part of his campaign, he may release information regarding
the progress of his policies. The probability the voter retains the incumbent is strictly
increasing in the voter’s beliefs about the utility he will receive from the incumbent’s
policy choice. One can think of this as retrospective voting or can assume that if the
incumbent is not reelected, his policy will be replaced by that of a challenger. The in-
cumbent desires to be reelected and also cares about the true utility of the voters. In this
setting, the first–best project is that which maximizes the expected utility of the voters.
Third, an entrepreneur chooses a project which he may need to sell part of to a
venture capitalist at the interim stage. The funding he receives is increasing in the beliefs
of potential buyers about the value of the project. He may have private information he
could disclose at the interim stage regarding how well the project is progressing. Again,
the first–best project is the one with the highest expected value.2
Fourth, consider a firm with multiple divisions, each of which could potentially head
up a prestigious project. The agent is the first division to have an opportunity to lead
and the observer is senior management. The agent has to decide among several ways to
try to achieve success on the project, where each method corresponds to a probability
distribution over profits from the project. The agent may have private information about
the progress of the project that he could disclose at the interim stage. If senior manage-
ment believes the project has not been handled sufficiently well at the interim stage, it
transfers control to another division.
In some of these settings, it is natural to consider a challenger to the agent who might
also have access to information he can disclose. For example, in the case of an incumbent
politician, it is natural to suppose that a challenger running against him might be able
to disclose information about the incumbent’s policies. Similarly, in the example of a
2We thank David Kreps for this example.
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firm deciding whether to retain the current project manager or opt for an alternative,
the alternative manager might have information about what is happening which he could
disclose.
Again using the Dye evidence structure, we will show that in the extreme case where
all disclosure is by the challenger, the agent has an incentive to behave in a risk–averse
manner. In effect, the option value lies entirely with his opponent, so he wishes to
minimize risk to reduce the value of this (negative) option. When both the agent and the
challenger can disclose, the effect of disclosure on action choice depends on which is more
likely to obtain evidence he can disclose. If the agent has more access to information in
this sense than the challenger, excessively risky decisions are made, while if the challenger
has more access, then excessively risk–averse choices result. Only when information is
exactly balanced are production decisions first–best.3
While it is an empirical question whether these effects are large in reality, we show
that they can be quite large by characterizing the worst possible equilibrium payoff for the
agent relative to the first–best payoff. For example, we show that there are parameters
for which there is an equilibrium where the agent’s payoff is arbitrarily close to 50% of
the first–best payoff, but it is impossible for his payoff to be lower than this. (We also
characterize the worst–case payoffs with a challenger.) As we show, one advantage of
characterizing worst–case payoffs is that this minimum has more intuitive comparative
static properties than a characterization of equilibria for fixed parameters.
In the next section, we illustrate the basic ideas with a simple example. In Section 3,
we give an overview of the most general version of the Dye model we study. As we show
in Section 6, the analysis of the general version can be reduced to the special cases where
only the agent has access to information to disclose and where only the challenger has
such access. In light of this and the fact that these special cases are simpler, we begin with
them in Sections 4 and 5 respectively. In Section 7, we discuss two alternative models,
illustrating how the nature of the inefficiencies depends on the disclosure technology.
Specifically, we show that if projects differ in the extent to which they yield disclosable
evidence, then there is a bias in favor of more transparent projects (those more likely to
yield evidence). In a model where projects yield outcomes in more than one dimension,
we show that there is a “hitting–for–the–fences” bias: the agent will choose projects
that are more likely to succeed in the dimension on which all projects are least likely to
succeed. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
The remainder of this introduction is a brief survey of the related literature. There
is a large literature on disclosure, beginning with Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981).
These papers established a key result which is useful for some of what follows. They con-
3Given the continuity of the model, if information is “close” to balanced, then production decisions
are “close” to the first best.
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sider a model where an agent wishes to persuade an observer, but only through disclosure
— the agent cannot affect the underlying distribution over outcomes. They assume the
agent is known to have information and show that “unraveling” leads to the conclusion
that the unique equilibrium is for the agent to always disclose his information. Roughly,
the reasoning is that the agent with the best possible information will disclose, rather than
pool with any lower types. Hence the agent with the second–best possible information
cannot pool with the better information and so will also disclose, etc. Subsequent im-
portant contributions including Verrecchia (1983), Dye (1985a), Jung and Kwon (1988),
Fishman and Hagerty (1990), Okuno–Fujiwara, Postlewaite, and Suzumura (1990), Shin
(1994, 2003), Lipman and Seppi (1995), Glazer and Rubinstein (2004, 2006), Forges and
Koessler (2005, 2008), Archarya, DeMarzo, and Kremer (2011), and Guttman, Kremer,
and Skrzypacz (2014) add features to the model which block this unraveling result and
explore the implications. To explore the effect of disclosure on productive activities by
the agent, we also need a model of disclosure in which unraveling does not occur. We
primarily focus on the approach initially developed by Dye (1985a) and Jung and Kwon
(1988) for this purpose.
While the literature on disclosure is large, relatively little attention has been paid to
the interaction of disclosure and production decisions and the papers that do consider
this take very different approaches from ours.4 Some papers consider “real effects” of
disclosure through its effect on the discloser’s competitors (Verrecchia (1983) or Dye
(1985b)) or effects that work through how disclosure affects the informativeness of stock
prices (Diamond and Verrecchia (1991), Bond and Goldstein (2015), or Gao and Liang
(2013)). In Dye and Sridhar (2002), disclosure generates information for the manager
through the market’s response to the disclosure. Wen (2013) considers a model where a
firm can only disclose if it invests, so that it may undertake unprofitable investments in
order to have the opportunity to disclose. While these factors have effects on the firm’s
productive decisions, they are very different effects than the incentive issues we study.
There are at least two other literatures where an agent’s productive decisions have
informational consequences that influence those decisions. First, in the career concerns
literature initiated by Holmstrom (1999), an agent whose abilities are unknown to the
market (and possibly to himself) chooses actions whose outcomes are observed by the
market and used to form beliefs about his abilities. See Chen (2015) for a recent con-
tribution to and summary of this literature. Second, there are several papers following
Stein (1989) in assuming that the manager may have an incentive to divert future cash
flows to the present in order to mislead the market about the long–run value of the firm.
In this setting, the nature of mandatory disclosure rules (e.g., the frequency of disclosure
and the kind of information which must be disclosed) have welfare implications through
4Numerous papers in the accounting literature have observed that the Dye disclosure model makes
the firm’s payoff convex in cash flows, but, to the best of our knowledge, none have noted the implications
of this for risk–taking incentives. See, for example, Ostaszewski and Gietzmann (2007).
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the effect on the manager’s diversion of cash flows or other investment distortions. See,
for example, Kanodia and Mukherji (1996), Kanodia, Sapra, and Venugopalan (2004),
Edmans, Heinle, and Huang (2013), Gigler, Kanodia, Sapra, and Venugopalan (2013), or
the broader overview in Kanodia and Sapra (2015).5
In both of these literatures, the inefficiencies demonstrated are related to the ineffi-
ciency we study in that all are generated by an agent’s concern both for the true outcome
of his decisions but also the perceptions of an observer. The agent’s desire to influence
the latter causes him to take actions which would be suboptimal if he cared only about
the former. The key difference between these papers and our work is that we focus on
how the agent’s control of disclosure affects his incentives. In the career concerns and
short–termism literatures, the manager/agent cannot control information except through
his productive actions.6 In our model, the agent controls both factors and the key is the
interaction between them.
A different approach to incentive effects associated with strategic disclosure is taken
by Beyer and Guttmann (2012) who consider a model in which disclosure interacts with
investment and financing decisions. Their paper is primarily focused on the signaling
effects stemming from private information about the exogenous quality of investment
opportunities. Thus both the nature and source of the inefficiency are very different
from what we consider.
Finally, we note that the analysis of DeMarzo, Kremer, and Skrzypacz (2017), while
motivated differently from ours, has interesting connections with what we do. To clarify
the relationship of the models, consider the example above where the agent is the manager
of a firm and the observer is the market. In our model, the manager chooses a project
which has stochastic outcomes and later may have the option of disclosing information
about those outcomes. In DeMarzo, Kremer, and Skrzypacz, the manager does not know
and cannot affect the true profits of the firm, but can carry out statistical tests to learn
about the profits and then can decide whether to disclose the outcomes of these tests.
This is equivalent to specializing our model to the case where all projects available to
the manager yield the same expected value of profits. They provide a characterization
of the test chosen by the manager and use this characterization to derive results that go
beyond the analysis conducted here. For example, they characterize the informativeness
of the tests chosen by the manager and how this relates to the best test from the point
of view of the observer.
5These papers can be seen as part of a broader literature on moral hazard in corporate finance and
accounting. As in our paper, the manager, even if he represents the interests of current shareholders,
has an incentive to take actions to try to “fool” the market or other investors but, of course, is correctly
interpreted in equilibrium. As a result, he is worse off than if he could have committed to efficient choices
in the first place. See, for example, the risk shifting problem discussed in Jensen and Meckling (1976).
6Rodina (2016) considers the case where the principal can control the information.
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2 Illustrative Example
We begin with an illustrative example to highlight the intuition of our results. This
example is for a special case of the environment, where the agent has no challenger and
cares only about the observer’s beliefs. We explain the model in more detail in the next
section, stating here only what is needed for the example. Specifically, we analyze the
perfect Bayesian equilibria of a three–stage game. In the first stage, the agent chooses
a project to undertake where a project corresponds to a lottery over outcomes in R+.
In the second stage, with probability q1, the agent receives evidence revealing the exact
realization from the project. If he receives evidence, he can either disclose it or withhold
it. (If he has no evidence, he cannot show anything.)
The observer does not see the project chosen by the agent or whether he has evidence;
the observer sees only the evidence, if any, which is presented. In the third stage, the
observer forms a belief b about the outcome of the project which equals the expectation
of the outcome conditional on all public information. Thus if evidence was presented
in the second stage, the observer’s belief must equal the outcome shown. The agent’s
payoffs equal the observer’s belief, b.
Consider the following example. Assume q1 ∈ (0, 1), so the agent may or may not
have information. Also, assume that there are only two projects, F and G, where G is a
degenerate distribution yielding x = 4 with probability 1 and F gives 0 with probability
1/2 and 6 with probability 1/2. Recall that the agent’s ex ante payoff is the expectation
of the observer’s belief b. In equilibrium, the observer will make correct inferences about
the outcome of the project given what is or is not disclosed, so the expectation of the
observer’s belief must equal the expectation of x under the project chosen by the agent.
Hence if we have an equilibrium in which F is chosen, then the agent’s ex ante payoff
must be 3, while if we have an equilibrium in which G is chosen, the agent’s ex ante
payoff must be 4. In this sense, G is the best project for the agent. For this reason, we
say G is the first–best project and that 4 is the agent’s first–best payoff.
Despite the fact that the agent would like to commit to G, it is not an equilibrium
for him to choose it. To see this, suppose the observer expects the agent to choose this
project. Then if the agent discloses nothing, the observer believes this is only because
the agent did not receive any information (an event with positive probability in the
hypothetical equilibrium as q1 < 1) and so believes x = 4. Given this, suppose the
agent deviates to project F . Since the project choice is not seen by the observer, the
observer’s beliefs cannot change in response. If the outcome of project F is observed
by the agent to be 0, he can simply not disclose this and the observer will continue to
believe that x = 4. If the outcome is observed to be 6, the agent can disclose this,
changing the observer’s belief to x = 6. Hence the agent’s payoff to deviating is a
convex combination of 4 and 6 and hence is strictly larger than 4. (Specifically, it is
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(1 − q1)(4) + q1[(1/2)(4) + (1/2)(6)] > 4.) So it is not an equilibrium for the agent to
choose project G. One can show that if 0 < q1 ≤ 1/2, then the unique equilibrium in this
example is for the agent to choose project F .7 Thus the agent is worse off than in the
first–best. His inability to commit leads him to deviate from projects that are efficient
but not “showy” enough. Since such deviations are anticipated in equilibrium, he ends
up choosing an inefficient project and suffering the consequences.
In this example, the agent’s expected payoff as a proportion of his first–best payoff
is 3/4. An implication of Theorem 2 is that, for all q1 and all sets of feasible projects,
the agent’s equilibrium payoff must be at least half the first–best utility and that this
bound can be essentially achieved (that is, we can find parameters for which there is an
equilibrium payoff as close as we want to this bound).
3 Model
In this section, we present the most general version of the model we consider and explain
the basic structure of equilibria. In the following sections, we discuss the inefficiencies of
the equilibria.
Now the game has three players — the agent, the challenger, and the observer. As
in the example, there are three stages. In the first stage, the agent chooses a project
to undertake. Each project corresponds to a lottery over outcomes. The set of feasible
lotteries is denoted F where each F ∈ F is a (cumulative) distribution function over R+.
For simplicity, we assume the supports of the feasible distributions are bounded from
below by 0 and from above by x¯. That is, we assume that there exists x¯ <∞ such that
F (x¯) = 1 for all F ∈ F . We assume the set F is finite with at least two elements.8
In the second stage, there is a random determination of whether the agent or chal-
lenger has evidence demonstrating the outcome of the project. As in Dye (1985a), we
assume that evidence, if it exists, proves exactly what the outcome of the project is —
there is no “partial” evidence. In the conclusion, we comment briefly on how the results
change when partial evidence is possible. Let q1 denote the probability that the agent
has evidence and q2 the probability that the challenger has evidence. We assume that the
events that the agent has evidence and that the challenger has evidence are independent
of one another and that both are independent of the project chosen by the agent and
its realization.9 If a player has evidence, then he can either present it, demonstrating
7If q1 ∈ (1/2, 1), the unique equilibrium is mixed.
8The assumption that F is finite is a simple way to ensure equilibrium existence. Also, it is not
difficult to allow for unbounded supports as long as all relevant expectations exist.
9As shown in Section 6, our results do not rely on the first of these independence assumptions. We
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conclusively the outcome of the project, or he can withhold it. If he has no evidence, he
cannot show anything. The decisions by the agent and challenger regarding whether to
show their evidence (if they have any) are made simultaneously.10 Neither the agent nor
the challenger sees whether the other has evidence. The observer does not see the project
chosen by the agent nor whether he or the challenger has evidence — the observer sees
only the evidence, if any, which is presented and by whom.
In the third stage, the observer forms a belief b about the outcome of the project which
equals the expectation of x conditional on all public information.11 Thus if evidence was
presented in the second stage, the observer’s belief must equal the outcome shown since
evidence is conclusive.
Finally, the outcome of the project is realized and observed. The payoffs are as
follows. Let x be the realization of the project and b the observer’s belief in the third
stage. The agent’s payoff is αx + (1 − α)b where α ∈ [0, 1].12 The challenger’s payoff is
−b. Because the challenger cannot affect x, the results would be the same if we assumed
the challenger’s payoff is βx+ (1− β)(−b) for β ∈ [0, 1), for example.
Note that the game is completely specified by a feasible set of projects F and the
values of α, q1, and q2. For this reason, we sometimes write an instance of this game as a
tuple (F , α, q1, q2). Throughout, we consider perfect Bayesian equilibria (Fudenberg and
Tirole, 1991).
Before characterizing equilibria of this game, we consider the benchmark case where
the information seen by the observer is not strategically determined. In other words,
suppose the observer sees the realization of the project at stage 2 with probability q ∈
[0, 1], unaffected by any actions of the agent or challenger. Except for the degenerate
case where α = q = 0, the optimal project choice by the agent is any project F which
maximizes the expectation of x with respect to F , denoted EF (x). We refer to such a
project F as a first–best project. To see this, let xˆ denote the belief of the observer if he
does not see any evidence. Then if the agent chooses project F , his expected payoff in
equilibrium is
αEF (x) + (1− α) [qEF (x) + (1− q)xˆ] .
use it only for notational convenience. We relax the other independence assumption in Section 7.1.
10As will be clear from the analysis, the results also hold if the players move sequentially.
11For expositional simplicity, we do not explicitly model the payoffs of the observer as they are ir-
relevant for the equilibrium analysis. Among other formulations, one could assume that the observer
chooses an action b and has payoff −(x− b)2. Obviously, the observer would then choose b equal to the
conditional expected value of x. The examples in the introduction suggest various other payoff functions
for the observer.
12The linearity of the agent’s payoff in x and the belief of the observer is not without loss of generality.
Similar forces exist with nonlinear payoff functions, but nonlinearity creates additional, potentially quite
different, tradeoffs.
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Obviously, unless α = q = 0, the agent’s payoff is maximized at any project F which
maximizes EF (x). As we show later in Section 7.1, this conclusion holds even if q depends
on the chosen project, as long as it does not depend on the realized x.
As the example in Section 2 showed, equilibria are typically not first–best when
disclosure is chosen by the agent strategically. If the observer expects the agent to
choose a first–best project, he may have an incentive to deviate to a less efficient project
which has a better chance of a very good outcome, preventing his choice of the first–best
from being an equilibrium. Of course, in equilibrium, his choice is anticipated, so he ends
up worse off.
Now we turn to the general structure of equilibria in this model. So suppose we have
an equilibrium where the agent uses a mixed strategy σ where σ(F ) is the probability the
agent chooses project F . Again, let xˆ denote the belief of the observer if he is not shown
any evidence at stage 2. If q1 and q2 are both strictly less than 1, then this information
set must have a strictly positive probability of being reached.
Given xˆ, it is easy to determine the optimal disclosure strategies for the agent and
the challenger. Suppose the agent obtains proof that the outcome is x. Clearly, he is
better off with this revealed if x > xˆ and better off with it not revealed if xˆ > x. It
is easy to use this to show that in any equilibrium, the agent discloses x if x > xˆ.13 If
x < xˆ, the agent discloses only if the challenger is disclosing with probability 1 so that
the agent’s choice is irrelevant. Finally, if x = xˆ, the equilibrium is entirely unaffected by
the disclosure choice so, for simplicity, we assume the agent discloses in this situation.14
Hence without loss of generality, we can take the agent’s strategy to be to disclose x iff
x ≥ xˆ. Similar comments apply to the challenger, so we can take his strategy to be to
disclose x iff x ≤ xˆ.
In light of this, we can write the agent’s payoff as a function of the project F and xˆ
13Clearly, if the probability the challenger would reveal this information is less than 1, then the agent
is strictly better off revealing than not revealing. So suppose the challenger reveals this information with
probability 1 — that is, q2 = 1 and the challenger’s strategy given x is to disclose it. Since the challenger
would not want to reveal this information, the only way this could be optimal for the challenger is if the
agent is also disclosing it, rendering the challenger indifferent between disclosing and not. Hence, either
way, the agent must disclose this information with probability 1.
14It is obvious that a player’s choice when he observes x = xˆ is irrelevant if this is a measure zero
event. However, even with discrete distributions, this remains true. First, obviously, a player’s payoff is
unaffected by what he does when indifferent. Second, if either the agent or challenger is indifferent, the
other is as well, so the agent’s choice doesn’t affect the challenger or conversely. Finally, the indifferent
player’s choice does not affect the observer’s posterior beliefs since this is a matter of whether we include
a term equal to the average in the average or not — it cannot affect the calculation.
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as
VA(F, xˆ) =αEF (x) + (1− α)
î
(1− q1)(1− q2)xˆ+ q1(1− q2)EF max{x, xˆ} (1)
+ q2(1− q1)EF min{x, xˆ}+ q1q2EF (x)
ó
.
We can complete the characterization of equilibria as follows. First, given xˆ, we have
VA(F, xˆ) = max
G∈F
VA(G, xˆ) for all F such that σ(F ) > 0.
That is, the agent’s mixed strategy is optimal given the disclosure behavior described
above and the observer’s choice of xˆ.
Second, given σ, xˆ must be the expectation of x conditional on no evidence being
presented and given the disclosure strategies and the observer’s belief that the project
was chosen according to distribution σ. The most convenient way to state this is to use
the law of iterated expectations to write it as∑
F∈F
σ(F )EF (x) =
∑
F∈F
σ(F )
î
(1− q1)(1− q2)xˆ+ q1(1− q2)EF max{x, xˆ} (2)
+ q2(1− q1)EF min{x, xˆ}+ q1q2EF (x)
ó
.
The left–hand side is the expectation of x given the mixed strategy used by the agent in
selecting a project. The right–hand side is the expectation of the observer’s expectation
of x given the disclosure strategies and the agent’s mixed strategy for selecting a project.
Substituting from equation (2) into equation (1) yields the conclusion that the agent’s
equilibrium expected payoff is
∑
F∈F σ(F )EF (x). Thus the agent’s payoff in any equilib-
rium must be weakly below the first–best payoff.
Also, if α = q1 = q2 = 0, then VA(F, xˆ) = xˆ. In this case, the agent’s actions do
not affect his payoff, so he is indifferent over all projects. Henceforth, we refer to a
game (F , α, q1, q2) with α = q1 = q2 = 0 as degenerate and call the game nondegenerate
otherwise.
4 Agent Only
In this section, we focus on the case where the challenger is effectively not present.
Specifically, we consider the model of the previous section for the special case where
q2 = 0. This is of interest in part because there is no obvious counterpart of the challenger
in some natural examples which otherwise fit the model well. Also, as we will see in
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Section 6, the general model can be reduced either to this special case or the special case
discussed in the next section where only the challenger may have information.
When q2 = 0, equation (1) defining VA(F, xˆ) reduces to
VA(F, xˆ) = αEF (x) + (1− α)[(1− q1)xˆ+ q1EF max{x, xˆ}]. (3)
Thus the agent chooses the project F to maximize EF [αx + (1 − α)q1 max{x, xˆ}] for a
certain value of xˆ. If xˆ were exogenous and we simply considered αx+(1−α)q1 max{x, xˆ}
to be the agent’s von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function, we would conclude that
the agent is risk loving since this is a convex function of x (as long as (1 − α)q1 > 0).
The results we show below build on this observation, making more precise the way this
incentive to take risks is manifested in the agent’s equilibrium choices.
To clarify the sense in which the agent’s choices are risk seeking, we first recall some
standard concepts.
Definition 1. Given two distributions F and G over R+, G dominates F in the sense
of second–order stochastic dominance, denoted G SOSD F , if for all z ≥ 0,∫ z
0
F (x) dx ≥
∫ z
0
G(x) dx.
We say that F is riskier than G if G SOSD F and EF (x) = EG(x).
It is well–known that if G SOSD F , then every risk averse agent prefers G to F . If
F is riskier than G, then every risk–loving agent prefers F to G and every risk neutral
agent is indifferent between the two.15
As shown above, for any xˆ, given the equilibrium disclosure behavior, the agent’s
payoff function is convex in x. This implies that if the distribution F is riskier than G,
then the pure strategy F must yield a weakly higher payoff for the agent.
Of course, this observation does not imply that there are no equilibria in which the
agent chooses G. Note that the agent’s payoff function is piecewise linear. Hence if the
distributions of F and G differ only within a given linear segment, the agent would see
F and G as equivalent, so he could certainly choose G in equilibrium. But then a slight
first–order stochastic dominance improvement in either F or G would lead the agent to
strictly prefer the improved project. This means that we could not say that the agent
sacrifices efficiency to choose a riskier project.
15The reason that the mean condition has to be added for the second two comparisons is that if G
SOSD F , then the mean of G must be weakly larger than the mean of F . Clearly, if it is strictly larger,
then G could be better than F even for a risk–loving agent.
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To characterize the situations where such a sacrifice is made, we need a result where,
at equal means, the agent strictly prefers the riskier project. Then a small improvement
in the efficiency of the less risky project will not lead him to deviate, so inefficiencies
occur due to the agent’s preference for risk.
Below, we show that under mild conditions, a strengthening of the risk comparison
creates the strict comparison we seek, ruling out use of the less risky project in any
equilibrium. Under this condition, even if we slightly improve the less risky project, the
agent continues to choose the less efficient but riskier project.
The stronger notion of riskier is given in the following definition.
Definition 2. Given two distributions F and G over [a, b] with 0 < a < b, G strongly
dominates F in the sense of second–order stochastic dominance, denoted G SSOSD F , if
for all z ∈ (a, b), ∫ z
0
F (x) dx >
∫ z
0
G(x) dx.
We say that F is strongly riskier than G if G SSOSD F and EF (x) = EG(x).
One can show that if F is strongly riskier than G, then for every continuous and
increasing utility function u with uniformly bounded directional derivatives, F yields
strictly higher expected utility than G if the agent is risk loving and not risk neutral,
while G yields strictly higher expected utility than F if the agent is risk averse and not
risk neutral.
Under three conditions, this notion gives the desired strict comparison. The first is
that α < 1 so that the agent cares about the observer’s belief, not just the realization of
x. The second is that q1 ∈ (0, 1). We rule out q1 = 0 so that the agent has a chance to
disclose information and rule out q1 = 1 so that he has the ability to withhold information
as well. Third, we need to ensure that xˆ, the observer’s belief if there is no disclosure, is
between the lower and upper bound of the supports of the distributions being compared.
The simplest way to achieve this is to assume that all projects have the same lower and
upper bounds.
Theorem 1. Suppose q2 = 0, α < 1, and q1 ∈ (0, 1). Suppose all distributions in F have
supports with minimum x ≥ 0 and maximum x¯ > x. If there are distributions F,G ∈ F
such that F is strongly riskier than G, then G is chosen with zero probability in every
equilibrium.16
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that there is an equilibrium in which the agent chooses
G with strictly positive probability. Then the payoff to G must exceed the payoff to F .
16This result also holds in a model of project choice with disclosure modeled as in Verrecchia (1983)
if the cost of disclosure is small enough.
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Using equation (3), this implies
αEG(x) + (1− α)q1EG max{x, xˆ} ≥ αEF (x) + (1− α)q1EF max{x, xˆ}.
Since F is strongly riskier than G, they have the same mean. Hence, given α < 1 and
q1 > 0, this reduces to
EG max {x, xˆ} ≥ EF max {x, xˆ} .
Note that
EF max{x, xˆ} = F (xˆ)xˆ+
∫ x¯
xˆ
x dF (x).
Integration by parts shows that∫ xˆ
0
F (x) dx = F (xˆ)xˆ−
∫ xˆ
0
x dF (x) = F (xˆ)xˆ− EF (x) +
∫ x¯
xˆ
x dF (x),
so
EF max{x, xˆ} = EF (x) +
∫ xˆ
0
F (x) dx.
Hence we must have
EG(x) +
∫ xˆ
0
G(x) dx ≥ EF (x) +
∫ xˆ
0
F (x) dx.
Again, since F is strongly riskier than G, we have EG(x) = EF (x) implying∫ xˆ
0
G(x) dx ≥
∫ xˆ
0
F (x) dx.
Since all projects in F have minimum value x ≥ 0 and maximum value x¯, we must have
xˆ ∈ [0, x¯]. It is easy to show that we cannot have an equilibrium with xˆ = 0 or xˆ = x¯, so
xˆ ∈ (0, x¯). But this contradicts F being strongly riskier than G.
Theorem 1 compares distributions with the same means, but the strictness of the
agent’s preference implies that he will accept a slightly lower mean in order to obtain
more risk.17
As an extreme illustration, we generalize the example of Section 2 as follows. Suppose
α = 0 and let G be a degenerate distribution yielding x∗ with probability 1. There is a
pure strategy equilibrium in which the agent chooses G if and only if there is no other
feasible distribution that has any chance of producing a larger outcome. That is, this
is an equilibrium iff there is no F ∈ F with F (x∗) < 1. The conclusion that G is an
equilibrium if F (x∗) = 1 for all F ∈ F is obvious, so consider the converse. Suppose we
have an equilibrium in which the agent chooses G but F (x∗) < 1. Because the agent is
17See DeMarzo, Kremer, and Skrzypacz’s (2017) Proposition III for a related result.
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expected to choose G, we have xˆ = x∗. But then the agent could deviate to F and with
some (perhaps very small probability) will be able to show a better outcome than x∗,
yielding a payoff strictly above x∗. If he cannot, he shows nothing and receives payoff
x∗. Hence his expected payoff must be strictly larger than x∗, a contradiction. Note that
the mean of x under F could be arbitrarily smaller than the mean under G.
While the mean of F , the distribution to which the agent deviates, can be arbitrarily
smaller than the mean of G, this does not say that the agent’s payoff loss in equilibrium
is arbitrarily large. Since F may not itself be an equilibrium choice by the agent, such
a conclusion would not follow from the observation above. Below, we give tight lower
bounds on the ratio of the agent’s equilibrium payoff to his best feasible payoff which
show that the equilibrium payoff loss is not, in fact, arbitrarily large. For example, one
simple implication of this result is that, except in the degenerate case where α = q1 = 0,
the agent’s equilibrium payoff must always be at least half of his first–best payoff.
The more general result characterizes the ratio of the worst equilibrium payoff for the
agent to the first–best payoff.18 More precisely, given a game (F , α, q1, q2), let
UFB(F) = max
F∈F
EF (x).
So UFB is the first–best payoff for the agent. Let U(F , α, q1, q2) denote the set of equi-
librium payoffs for the agent in the game. We construct a function R(α, q1, q2) with the
following properties. First, for every F , for every U ∈ U(F , α, q1, q2),
U ≥ R(α, q1, q2)UFB(F).
That is, R(α, q1, q2) is a lower bound on the proportion of the first–best payoff that can
be obtained in equilibrium — i.e., on U/UFB for any equilibrium for any feasible set F .
Second, this bound is tight in the sense that for every ε > 0, there exists F and
U ∈ U(F , α, q1, q2) such that
U ≤ R(α, q1, q2)UFB(F) + ε.
We therefore sometimes refer to R as the “worst–case payoff” for the agent.
In this section, we focus on games with q2 = 0, so we only characterize the function
for this special case here, giving the more general characterization later.19
18This is essentially the inverse of what is sometimes called the Price of Anarchy. See, for example,
Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou (1999), who coined the term, or Roughgarden (2005).
19The exact statements of the lower bounds in Theorems 2 and 4 exploit our normalization that
the outcome from any project is non–negative. However, it is straightforward to adapt these bounds
to the more general case where there is some (not necessarily positive) lower bound for all supports.
Specifically, suppose x is a lower bound for all supports. When x = 0, our theorems characterize a
function R such that U ≥ RUFB and this bound is tight. When x 6= 0, what we are establishing is that
U ≥ RUFB + (1 − R)x and that this bound is tight. Note that this implies that if x ↓ −∞, then the
outcome can be arbitrarily worse than the first–best. We thank Bruno Strulovici for raising this issue.
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Theorem 2. For any nondegenerate game,
R(α, q1, 0) =
α + (1− α)q1
α + (1− α)q1(2− q1) .
Also, R(0, 0, 0) = 0. Hence for α > 0,
min
q1∈[0,1]
R(α, q1, 0) =
1 +
√
α
2
.
We offer several comments on this result. First, there is a discontinuity in the function
R at the degenerate case where α = q1 = q2 = 0. In the degenerate game, the agent’s
payoff is xˆ, but his actions cannot affect this. Hence for any F ∈ F , it is an equilibrium
for the agent to choose F since no deviation from this F will change his expected payoff.
Thus equilibrium payoffs can be substantially worse than in any nondegenerate game.
Consequently, our remaining remarks focus on the nondegenerate case.
Second, it is easy to see that R(α, q1, 0) is increasing in α and equals 1 at α = 1.
Hence, as one would expect, if α = 1, we obtain the first–best. In this case, the agent
does not care about the observer’s belief, only the true realization of x, and so is led to
maximize it (in expectation).
Third, it is not hard to show that R(α, q1, 0) is not monotonic in q1 except when
α = 0 or (trivially) α = 1. Specifically, given any α ∈ (0, 1), the unique value of q1 which
minimizes the bound is q1 =
√
α/[1 +
√
α], which is interior.
This non–monotonicity stems from the fact that when α > 0, we obtain the first–best
at both q1 = 0 and at q1 = 1. That is, R(α, 0, 0) = R(α, 1, 0) = 1 for all α > 0. When
q1 = 0, the agent cannot influence the observer’s beliefs and so cares only about the
true value of x. Hence he chooses the project which maximizes its expectation. When
q1 = 1, he is known to always have information. So the standard unraveling argument
implies that he must reveal the information always. Hence he cannot be strategic about
disclosure and therefore will again maximize the expected value of x.
Figure 1 illustrates Theorem 2. It shows R(α, q1, 0) as a function of q1 for various
values of α.
The proof of Theorem 2 is a little tedious and so is relegated to the Appendix. To
provide some intuition, we prove a simpler result here, namely, that for α = 0, the
agent’s payoff in any pure strategy equilibrium must be at least half the first–best in any
nondegenerate game. That is, we prove the last statement of the theorem for α = 0 with
a restriction to pure strategies.
So fix any feasible set of projects F , any q1 ∈ (0, 1], and an equilibrium in which the
agent chooses project F ∈ F . Fix the xˆ of the equilibrium and let G be any first–best
15
q1
R(α, q1, 0)
0.25 0.5 0.75 1.0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1.0
α = 0.7
α = 0.4
α = 0.15
α = 0
Figure 1: “Worst Case” as a Function of q1.
project. From equation (3), when q1 > 0, the optimality of F implies
EF max{x, xˆ} ≥ EG max{x, xˆ}.
This implies
EF (x) + xˆ ≥ EF max{x, xˆ} ≥ EG max{x, xˆ} ≥ EG(x)
where the first inequality follows from the fact that the x’s are always nonnegative. In
equilibrium, nondisclosure must alway be “bad news” in the sense that EF (x) ≥ xˆ,
implying 2EF (x) ≥ EF (x) + xˆ ≥ EG(x), so that the agent’s equilibrium payoff, EF (x),
must be at least half of the first–best payoff, as claimed.
To show that this bound is approximately achievable, consider the following example.
Let α = 0. Suppose F = {F,G} where F is a discrete distribution putting probability
1 − p on 0 and p on 1/p for some p ∈ (0, 1), so EF (x) = 1. Let G be a degenerate
distribution giving probability 1 to x = x∗. We construct an equilibrium where F is
chosen by the agent, so the agent’s equilibrium payoff, U , is 1. We focus on the case
where x∗ > 1, so UFB = x∗. If the observer expects the agent to choose F with probability
1, then by equation (2), xˆ solves
(1− q1)xˆ+ q1 [(1− p)xˆ+ 1] = 1
16
so
xˆ =
1− q1
1− q1p.
This is an equilibrium iff EG max{x, xˆ} ≤ EF max{x, xˆ} or
max{x∗, xˆ} ≤ (1− p)xˆ+ 1
=
(1− p)(1− q1)
1− q1p + 1 =
2− q1 − p
1− q1p .
It is easy to see that xˆ < 1 while, by assumption, x∗ > 1. So we have an equilibrium iff
x∗ ≤ 2− q1 − p
1− q1p .
Let x∗ equal the right–hand side. Then we have an equilibrium where the agent’s payoff
is 1, but the first–best payoff is x∗. By taking q1 and p arbitrarily close to 0, we can make
x∗ arbitrarily close to 2, so the agent’s payoff is arbitrarily close to half the first–best
payoff.20
The implication of Theorem 2 that the worst–case payoffs are increasing as the agent
cares more about the true x and less about the observer’s belief b is intuitive, but it is
important to note that this result does not carry over to equilibrium payoffs in general.
In Appendix C, we give an example which illustrates several senses in which equilibrium
payoffs can decrease as α increases for fixed F . In the example, there is a mixed strategy
equilibrium with payoffs that are decreasing in α. Also, this equilibrium is the worst
equilibrium for the agent for some parameters, showing that the worst equilibrium payoff
for a fixed F can decrease with α. Finally, the payoff in the worst pure strategy equilib-
rium is also decreasing in α for a certain range, showing that this result is not an artifact
related to mixed–strategy equilibria.
5 Challenger Only
In this section, we consider the case where q1 = 0 and q2 may be strictly positive. In this
case, the agent’s payoff as a function of xˆ and his chosen project F is
VA(F, xˆ) = αEF (x) + (1− α) [(1− q2)xˆ+ q2EF min{x, xˆ}] .
Analogously to our discussion in Section 4, we see that given xˆ, it is as if the agent has a
von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function of αx+ (1−α)q2 min{x, xˆ}. If (1−α)q2 > 0,
20Note that by taking p arbitrarily close to zero, we can make x∗ arbitrarily close to 2− q1, showing
the agent’s payoff can be arbitrarily close to 1/(2− q1) times the first–best payoff, exactly the bound in
Theorem 2 when α = 0.
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this function is concave, so the agent’s choices are effectively risk averse. Given this, the
agent must at least weakly prefer G to F whenever F is riskier than G. We can strengthen
this observation similarly to the way we strengthened the analogous observation in Section
4 to obtain the following analog to Theorem 1.
Theorem 3. Suppose q1 = 0 and (1 − α)q2 > 0. Suppose all distributions in F have
supports with minimum x ≥ 0 and maximum x¯ > x. If there are distributions F,G ∈ F
such that F is strongly riskier than G, then F is chosen with zero probability in every
equilibrium.
Proof. The proof parallels the proof of Theorem 1 with min replacing max and concave
replacing convex.
We can also characterize R for this case.21 More specifically, we have the following
analog to Theorem 2:
Theorem 4. For all nondegenerate games, we have
R(α, 0, q2) =
α
α + (1− α)q2 .
Hence for α > 0,
min
q2∈[0,1]
R(α, 0, q2) = α
and for q2 > 0,
min
α∈[0,1]
R(α, 0, q2) = 0.
Figure 2 illustrates this result. It shows R(α, 0, q2) as a function of q2 for the same
values of α as used in Figure 1.
Theorem 4 has some features in common with Theorem 2. In particular, both results
show that the outcome must be first–best when α = 1 or when α > 0 and there is
zero probability of disclosure (i.e., q2 = 0). In both cases, the worst case improves as α
increases.
On the other hand, this result also shows several differences from Theorem 2. First,
this result implies that the worst case over α when q1 > 0 and q2 = 0 is better than the
worst case when q1 = 0 and q2 > 0. In other words,
min
α∈[0,1]
R(α, q1, 0) > min
α∈[0,1]
R(α, 0, q2)
21While the proofs of Theorems 1 and 3 are essentially identical, those of Theorems 2 and 4 are not.
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Figure 2: “Worst Case” as a Function of q2.
for q1 > 0 and q2 > 0. The left–hand side is 1/2, while the right–hand side is 0. Since the
lower bound is zero and payoffs are non–negative, this implies that in the case where only
the challenger can disclose, the agent could be arbitrarily worse off than at the first–best.
Second, recall that for α ∈ (0, 1), the worst–case payoff in Theorem 2 was first de-
creasing, then increasing in q1, equalling the first–best at both q1 = 0 and q1 = 1. Here
the worst case is always decreasing in q2. In particular, we obtain the first–best at q2 = 0
but not at q2 = 1. This may seem unintuitive since at q2 = 1, the challenger is known to
have information and therefore the standard unraveling argument would seem to suggest
he must reveal it. Hence, one might expect, it is as if the observer always saw the true
x and so the outcome would seem to necessarily be first–best.
The following example shows why we do not necessarily obtain the first best at q2 = 1
and gives some broader intuition for Theorem 4. Suppose q2 = 1 but α = 0. In this
case, the lower bound given in Theorem 4 holds trivially since it only says that the
agent’s equilibrium payoff must be non–negative. To see that we can have equilibria
with payoffs arbitrarily close to zero, suppose that F = {F,G} where F gives ε ∈ (0, 50)
with probability 1, while G gives 0 with probability 1/2 and 100 with probability 1/2.
Obviously, G is the first–best project. But there is an equilibrium in which the agent
chooses F and obtains a payoff of ε. To see this, suppose F is the project the observer
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expects the agent to choose. Then if the challenger presents no evidence, the observer
believes the outcome to have been ε since this is the only feasible outcome under F .
Because of this, the agent has no incentive to deviate to G. If he does deviates and the
outcome is 0, the challenger can show this and the agent is hurt. If the outcome is 100,
the challenger can hide this and the observer thinks the outcome was ε, so the agent
does not gain. Since we only assume ε ∈ (0, 50), this shows that the agent’s equilibrium
payoff can be arbitrarily close to 0.
Intuitively, it is true that if the challenger always learns the outcome of the project,
we get unraveling and all information is revealed along the equilibrium path — i.e., when
the agent chooses the equilibrium project. On the other hand, we do not necessarily get
unraveling if the agent deviates to an unexpected project and this fact is what creates
the possibility of inefficient equilibria.
On the other hand, the efficient outcome is also an equilibrium if q2 = 1.
22 To see this,
fix any first–best project F and suppose the agent is expected to choose this project. Let
x∗ denote the supremum of the support of F and set xˆ = x∗. That is, assume that if the
challenger does not reveal x, the observer believes the realization is the largest possible
value under F . It is easy to see that this is what unraveling implies given that the agent
chooses F . So this is an equilibrium as long as the agent has no incentive to deviate to a
different project. By choosing F , the agent’s payoff is EF (x). If he deviates to any other
feasible project G, his expected payoff is
αEG(x) + (1− α)EG min{x, x∗} ≤ EG(x) ≤ EF (x).
So the agent has no incentive to deviate.
6 Agent and Challenger
Now we consider the case where both the agent and the challenger may have information
to disclose in the second stage. The following result shows that the analysis reduces to
either the case where only the agent has evidence or the case where only the challenger
has evidence, depending on whether q1 or q2 is larger.
22It is also worth noting that the efficient outcome is the only equilibrium when q2 = 1 if all projects
have the same support. That is, in the equal support case, R(α, 0, 1) = 1. We thank Georgy Egorov
for pointing this out. An implication of this is that Theorem 4, unlike all of our other results, does not
hold as stated if we add the assumption that all projects have the same support since we can no longer
achieve the stated worst–case for q2 = 1 under this assumption. On the other hand, the only change
needed for the equal support case is at q2 = 1 — for q2 < 1, the statement of Theorem 4 is correct even
in the equal support case.
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Theorem 5. Fix (F , α, q1, q2). If q1 ≥ q2, then the set of equilibria is the same as for
the game (F , αˆ, qˆ1, 0) where
αˆ = α + (1− α)q2
and
qˆ1 =
q1 − q2
1− q2 .
If q1 ≤ q2, then the set of equilibria is the same as for the game (F , αˆ, 0, qˆ2) where
αˆ = α + (1− α)q1
and
qˆ2 =
q2 − q1
1− q1 .
Corollary 1. For any nondegenerate game with q1 = q2, the outcome is first–best.
To see why Theorem 5 implies the corollary, suppose we have a nondegenerate game,
so it is not the case that α = q1 = q2 = 0. By Theorem 5, if q1 = q2, the outcome is the
same in the game with αˆ = α+ (1− α)q2 > 0 and qˆ1 = qˆ2 = 0. As shown in Theorem 2,
the outcome must be first–best in this case.
Proof of Theorem 5. Fix (F , α, q1, q2) and an equilibrium. Let xˆ be the observer’s belief
if no evidence is presented. First, assume q1 ≥ q2. Recall that the agent chooses F to
maximize
αEF (x) + (1− α)
î
(1− q1)(1− q2)xˆ+ q2(1− q1)EF min{x, xˆ}
+ q1(1− q2)EF max{x, xˆ}+ q1q2EF (x)
ó
.
Note that
EF min{x, xˆ}+ EF max{x, xˆ} = EF [min{x, xˆ}+ max{x, xˆ}] = EF (x) + xˆ.
Hence
EF min{x, xˆ} = EF (x) + xˆ− EF max{x, xˆ}. (4)
Substituting, we can rewrite the agent’s payoff as
[α + (1− α)q2]EF (x) + (1− α) [(1− q1)xˆ+ (q1 − q2)EF max{x, xˆ}] . (5)
Let αˆ = α + (1− α)q2, so 1− αˆ = (1− α)(1− q2). We can rewrite the above as
αˆEF (x) + (1− αˆ)(1− α)
ñ
1− q1
(1− α)(1− q2) xˆ+
q1 − q2
(1− α)(1− q2)EF max{x, xˆ}
ô
.
Let qˆ1 = (q1 − q2)/(1− q2), so 1− qˆ1 = (1− q1)/(1− q2) Then this is
αˆEF (x) + (1− αˆ)[(1− qˆ1)xˆ+ qˆ1EF max{x, xˆ}].
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This is exactly the agent’s payoff when the observer’s inference in response to no evi-
dence is xˆ in the game (F , αˆ, qˆ1, 0). Hence the agent’s best response to xˆ in the game
(F , α, q1, q2) is the same as in the game (F , αˆ, qˆ1, 0).
To see that the observer’s belief given a mixed strategy by the agent also does not
change, note that we can rewrite equation (2) as∑
F∈F
σ(F )EF (x) =
∑
F∈F
σ(F )
¶
αEF (x) + (1− α)
î
(1− q1)(1− q2)xˆ
+ q1(1− q2)EF max{x, xˆ}+ q2(1− q1)EF min{x, xˆ}+ q1q2EF (x)
ó©
.
We can rewrite the term in brackets in the same way we rewrote the agent’s payoff above
to obtain∑
F∈F
σ(F )EF (x) =
∑
F∈F
σ(F )
¶
αˆEF (x) + (1− αˆ)
î
(1− qˆ1)xˆ+ qˆ1EF max{x, xˆ}
ó©
,
which is the same equation that would define xˆ given σ in the game (F , αˆ, qˆ1, 0).
A similar substitution and rearrangement shows the result for q2 ≥ q1.
This result also holds for arbitrary correlation between the event that the agent
receives evidence and the event that the challenger does. To see this, let pb be the
probability that both have evidence, p1 the probability that only the agent has evidence,
p2 the probability that only the challenger has evidence, and pn the probability that
neither has evidence. So we now reinterpret q1 to be the marginal probability that the
agent has evidence — that is, q1 = p1 +pb — and reinterpret q2 analogously. It is easy to
see that our argument that the challenger will reveal any x he observes with x ≤ xˆ and
that the agent will reveal any x ≥ xˆ does not rely on any correlation assumption. Hence
the agent’s payoff as a function of F and xˆ is now
αEF (x) + (1− α)
î
pnxˆ+ p2EF min{x, xˆ}+ p1EF max{x, xˆ}+ pbEF (x)
ó
.
If we again substitute from equation (4), we obtain
αEF (x) + (1− α) [(pb + p2)EF (x) + (pn + p2)xˆ+ (p1 − p2)EF max{x, xˆ}] .
But p2 + pb = q2, pn + p2 = 1− pb− p1 = 1− q1, and p1− p2 = q1− q2. Substituting these
expressions, we can rearrange to obtain equation (5) and complete the proof exactly as
above.
We can use Theorem 5 to extend Theorems 2 and 4 to this setting. To see this, note
that the former theorem tells us that the worst possible payoff for the agent in (F , α, q1, 0)
is the first–best payoff times
α + (1− α)q1
α + (1− α)q1(2− q1) .
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Reinterpret this as our “translation” of a game (F , α, q1, q2) where q1 > q2. In other
words, we can treat this lower bound as
αˆ + (1− αˆ)qˆ1
αˆ + (1− αˆ)qˆ1(2− qˆ1)
where αˆ = α+ (1−α)q2 and qˆ1 = (q1− q2)/(1− q2). We can substitute in and rearrange
to obtain a lower bound as a function of (α, q1, q2) when q1 > q2 of
(1− q2)[α + (1− α)q1]
α + (1− α)q1(2− q1)− q2 .
Similar reasoning gives a lower bound when q2 > q1 of
α + (1− α)q1
α + (1− α)q2 .
These bounds reinforce the message of Theorem 5 in that both expressions equal 1
when q1 = q2 if either α > 0 or q1 > 0. Thus for any nondegenerate game, we obtain the
first–best when q1 = q2.
It is intuitive and not hard to see that the properties of R discussed earlier for the
cases q1 = 0 and q2 = 0 hold in general. Specifically, the worst–case payoff is increasing
in α and hence is minimal at α = 0. If q2 > q1, then it is decreasing in q2, while if
q1 > q2, it is non–monotonic in q1. In addition, we now can see that if qi > qj, then R is
continuously increasing in qj up to the first best when qj = qi. That is, making the less
informed player more equally informed is beneficial. Hence the worst case is that the less
informed player has no information at all.
7 Alternatives
The simple model explored above shows that the ability of the agent to control the flow
of information can give him incentives to take actions which create positive appearances
even if these conflict with creating positive outcomes. Since he cannot systematically
fool the observer, these incentives end up hurting the agent. In particular, with the
Dye model of disclosure, the agent has an incentive to take excessive risk since he can
(temporarily) hide bad outcomes. To the extent that hostile forces control the flow of
information, the agent has the opposite incentive, namely to avoid risk to an excessive
degree.
In this section, we use two examples of alternative forms of disclosure to show how
the nature of the inefficency created by the agent’s control of information depends on
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the technology of disclosure. First, we show the bias created when projects vary in
the probability that they generate disclosable evidence. Second, we illustrates how the
inefficiencies change with the possibility of a particular form of partial disclosure, rather
than the all–or–nothing disclosure of Dye. As these examples indicate, the inefficiency
generated by strategic disclosure can take many forms.
7.1 Varying Transparency Across Projects
In this section, we consider a variation on our model where the challenger never has
evidence and the probability the agent has evidence depends on the project he selects.
Here we denote a project by the pair (F, qF ) where F is a probability distribution over
outcomes x and qF is the probability the agent receives evidence he can disclose. In this
case, the inefficency is a distortion toward projects that are more transparent in the sense
of being more likely to yield disclosable information.
In particular, if two nondegenerate projects are identical except that one has a larger
probability that the agent receives evidence, then the project with the smaller probability
of receiving evidence must have zero probability in any equilibrium, a result analogous
to Theorem 1. We also give worst–case results analogous to Theorem 2.
First, we show that when the agent cannot control disclosure, he chooses a first–best
project in any equilibrium. More specifically, suppose that if the agent chooses project
F , then the observer sees the outcome of the project at stage 2 with probability qF . Here
the agent’s project choice affects the information the observer sees, but the agent does
not have a separate disclosure decision. Thus it is not obvious whether the project’s
effect on observability gives the agent an incentive to choose inefficiently. We reestablish
our benchmark for this model by showing that it does not.
To see this, fix any mixed strategy equilibrium σ. Because disclosure is not controlled
by the agent, the belief of the observer if he does not see the outcome in stage 2, xˆ, is
a weighted average of EF (x) for the F ’s in the support of σ where the weights depend
on the qF ’s. With this in mind, suppose F and G are projects in the support of σ with
EF (x) < EG(x). If such projects exist, then we can take them to satisfy EF (x) < xˆ <
EG(x). Since both are in the support of the mixed strategy, the agent must be indifferent
between them, so
αEF (x)+(1−α)(1−qF )xˆ+(1−α)qFEF (x) = αEG(x)+(1−α)(1−qG)xˆ+(1−α)qGEG(x),
implying
αEF (x) + (1− α)qF (EF (x)− xˆ) = αEG(x) + (1− α)qG (EG(x)− xˆ) .
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But EF (x) < EG(x) and EF (x) − xˆ < 0 < EG(x) − xˆ, a contradiction. Hence EF (x) =
EG(x) = xˆ for all F and G in the support of σ. So if F is in the support of σ and F
′ is
not, optimality implies
EF (x) ≥ αEF ′(x) + (1− α)(1− qF ′)EF (x) + (1− α)qF ′EF ′(x),
which implies EF (x) ≥ EF ′(x). Hence every project with positive probability in equilib-
rium must be first best when disclosure is nonstrategic.
We now characterize the inefficiencies due to strategic disclosure in this setting. In
particular, we show two results which are analogs for Theorems 1 and 2.
Theorem 6. Suppose there are feasible projects (F, qF ) and (G, qG) where F = G, F is
nondegenerate, and qG > qF . Then if α < 1, project (F, qF ) is chosen with zero probability
in any equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that there is an equilibrium in which (F, qF ) is chosen
with strictly positive probability. Then we must have
αEF (x) + (1− α)(1− qF )xˆ+ (1− α)qFEF max{x, xˆ}
≥ αEG(x) + (1− α)(1− qG)xˆ+ (1− α)qGEG max{x, xˆ}
where xˆ is the observer’s belief if the agent does not disclose any evidence. Since F = G,
this implies
qF [EF max{x, xˆ} − xˆ] ≥ qG[EF max{x, xˆ} − xˆ].
Since qG > qF , this requires xˆ ≥ x¯F where x¯F is the upper bound of the support of F .
Given this, the payoff to F in equilibrium is αEF (x) + (1− α)xˆ < xˆ. The inequality
follows from xˆ ≥ x¯F and is strict because F is nondegenerate by assumption. But it is
easy to show that the agent’s equilibrium payoff is∑
F ′
σ(F ′)EF ′(x) ≥ xˆ,
where σ is the agent’s mixed strategy. Hence the agent’s equilibrium payoff strictly
exceeds the payoff to project (F, qF ), a contradiction.
The following analog of Theorem 2 shows that the worst case is given by the trivial
lower bound which says that the agent’s equilibrium payoff must weakly exceed the payoff
to deviating to the first–best project and having the observer believe that x = 0.
Theorem 7. For any set of feasible projects, any α ∈ [0, 1], and any equilibrium, the
agent’s payoff is at least α times the first–best payoff. Furthermore, there exists a set
of feasible projects and an equilibrium such that the agent’s payoff equals α times the
first–best.
25
Proof. To show the bound, fix any set of feasible projects, any α, and any equilibrium.
Let U be the agent’s payoff in the equilibrium and let xˆ be the belief in response to no
disclosure in the equilibrium. Let (F, qF ) be any first–best project. Then
U ≥ αEF (x) + (1− α)qFEF max{x, xˆ}+ (1− α)(1− qF )xˆ
≥ αEF (x)
where the second inequality uses the fact that x ≥ 0 with probability 1. Hence U is at
least α times the first–best payoff.
To see that this is attainable, fix any y ≥ 0 and any U ∈ [αy, y). Let the feasible set
of projects consist of two projects, (F, 0) and (G, 1) where F yields y with probability 1
and G yields 2U with probability 1/2 and 0 otherwise. Clearly, (F, 0) is the first–best
project. However, it is easy to see that it is an equilibrium for the agent to choose project
(G, 1). To see this, suppose it is the project the observer expects. Then xˆ must satisfy
U =
1
2
xˆ+
1
2
(2U),
so xˆ = 0. Hence if the agent were to deviate to project (F, 0), his payoff would be
αy + (1 − α)(0). Since U ≥ αy, the agent has no incentive to deviate from (G, 1), so
this is an equilibrium. In particular, this construction gives an equilibrium even when
U = αy, showing there is an equilibrium with payoff equal to α times the first–best.
7.2 Hitting for the Fences
Our second example illustrates possible inefficiencies under partial disclosure. As in Shin
(2003), suppose the agent’s choice of a project affects two outcomes. For example, if the
agent is a political leader, then his choices may affect the economy and also foreign affairs.
We refer to the two outcomes as the outcomes on two different issues. For simplicity,
suppose that on each issue, the outcome is either a success or a failure, where success
corresponds to an outcome of 1 and failure to a 0. So the total value of the projects is
simply the number of successes achieved across issues, either 0, 1, or 2.
Suppose there are two possible projects, F and G. Let fi denote the probability of
success on issue i under project F and define gi analogously. We assume these realizations
are independent across issues. Finally, suppose that one issue is harder than the other in
the sense that it has a lower probability of success regardless of the project. Specifically,
assume f1 > f2 and g1 > g2, so it is more difficult to succeed on issue 2.
Our assumptions on disclosure generalize those above. Specifically, with probability
q, the agent is able to disclose the outcome on a given issue, where these events are
26
independent across issues, independent of the outcome on the issue, and independent
of the agent’s project choice. Again, we consider only disclosure by the agent, not by
a challenger. As before, one can show that the agent chooses the first–best project if
disclosure is nonstrategic (in the sense that the observer sees the outcome on a given
issue with probability q, independent of the outcome on that issue).
When the agent controls disclosure, the bias we get in this setting is a hitting–for–the–
fences effect. More specifically, if the two projects are equally efficient in the sense that
they have the same expected total outcome, then in the unique equilibrium (subject to
refinement issues discussed below), the agent chooses whichever project gives the higher
chance of success on the harder issue. For concreteness, suppose f1 > g1 > g2 > f2. Then
G has the better chance of success on issue 2, the harder issue, so our claim is that the
agent chooses G in the unique equilibrium.
To see the intuition, note that in an equilibrium, the agent will disclose the outcome
on an issue if it is a success and he is able to disclose it. He will never disclose a failure
on an issue. Thus if he does not disclose anything on an issue, the observer knows that
either it was a failure or the agent cannot disclose it. If the agent does not disclose an
outcome on issue 1, the observer recognizes that success is relatively likely on issue 1
anyway, so, relative to issue 2, this is more likely to reflect an inability to disclose, not
unwillingness to do so. Thus the lack of disclosure is not as harmful to the agent on issue
1 as it is on issue 2. But this means he is more concerned about being able to show a
success on issue 2 and hence will focus his efforts there. Then he will prefer project G
to project F since G gives the better chance of success on issue 2. Thus even if success
is extremely unlikely on issue 2 regardless of the project, the comparison on issue 2 still
determines the agent’s choice.
Intuitively, this effect looks like the bias toward riskiness shown in Section 4 since
focusing on issue 2 seems riskier. As we show below, our assumptions do imply that
the G is the riskier project. However, this selection of the riskier project only occurs
when one issue is harder than the other. If one issue is harder under one project but less
hard under the other, then the agent randomizes between projects, even if one project is
riskier than the other.
To formalize this intuition, we assume that F and G have the same expected value
— that is, that f1 + f2 = g1 + g2. Since the means are the same and the projects are not
identical, one project has a strictly higher success probability on issue 1 and the other
has a strictly higher success probability on issue 2. Without loss of generality, assume
f1 > g1 and f2 < g2. Note for future use that equal means, f1 > g1, and g2 > f2 imply
that we must have either
f1 > max{g1, g2} ≥ min{g1, g2} > f2
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or
g2 > max{f1, f2} ≥ min{f1, f2} > g1.
As suggested above, it seems natural that the agent discloses all successes and no
failures. It is easy to see that this will form an equilibrium. For any issue on which the
observer is not shown an outcome, he infers (correctly) that either the agent has nothing
to disclose on that issue or the outcome was a failure. This is worse for the agent than
disclosing a success on that issue but better than disclosing a failure, so the optimal
response is disclosing all successes and no failures. While this equilibrium seems natural,
others are possible analogously to Appendix A of Shin (2003). We define an equilibrium
to be natural if the agent discloses all available successes and no failures and focus only
on natural equilibria.
Theorem 8. Fix any α ∈ [0, 1) and any q1 ∈ (0, 1). If f1 > g1 ≥ g2 > f2, the
unique natural equilibrium is for the agent to choose project G with probability 1. If
g2 > f2 ≥ f1 > g1, the unique natural equilibrium is for the agent to choose project F
with probability 1. Finally, if f1 > g2 > g1 > f2 or if g2 > f1 > f2 > g1, there is a unique
natural equilibrium in which the agent chooses a nondegenerate mixed strategy.
Note that if issue i is always harder than issue j in the sense that fj > fi and gj > gi,
then we must be in one of the first two cases described in the theorem. Hence the agent
chooses the project with the greater probability of success on issue i, the “hitting for the
fences” effect.
Proof. Fix a natural equilibrium. Define xˆi to be the observer’s expected outcome on
issue i given that the agent does not disclose anything on issue i. Since the equilibrium
is natural, this is well–defined.
The agent prefers F to G iff∑
i
[αEF (xi) + (1− α)q1EF max{xi, xˆi}] ≥
∑
i
[αEG(xi) + (1− α)q1EG max{xi, xˆi}].
Since the means of the projects are the same and since (1− α)q1 > 0, this holds iff∑
i
EF max{xi, xˆi} ≥
∑
i
EG max{xi, xˆi}
or
f1 + (1− f1)xˆ1 + f2 + (1− f2)xˆ2 ≥ g1 + (1− g1)xˆ1 + g2 + (1− g2)xˆ2,
where we use 0 ≤ xˆi ≤ 1. Using equal means again, we can rewrite this as
g1xˆ1 + g2xˆ2 ≥ f1xˆ1 + f2xˆ2
28
or
(g2 − f2)xˆ2 ≥ (f1 − g1)xˆ1.
By equal means, g2 − f2 = f1 − g1. By assumption, this is strictly positive. Hence the
agent weakly prefers F to G iff xˆ2 ≥ xˆ1.
Given this, when is it an equilibrium for the agent to choose F? When the agent
chooses F , xˆi is defined by
fi = (1− q1)xˆi + q1[fi + (1− fi)xˆi]
so
xˆi =
fi(1− q1)
1− q1fi .
Since this is increasing in fi, we have xˆ2 ≥ xˆ1 iff f2 ≥ f1. Therefore, we have an
equilibrium in which the agent chooses F iff g2 > f2 ≥ f1 > g1.
The analogous reasoning shows that it is an equilibrium for the agent to choose G iff
f1 > g1 ≥ g2 > f2. Clearly, these parameter conditions are mutually exclusive.
Finally, when is it an equilibrium for the agent to use a nondegenerate mixed strategy?
Let σ be the probability on F . Let sσi = σfi + (1 − σ)gi. Then the same reasoning as
above shows that
xˆi =
sσi (1− q1)
1− q1sσi
.
Indifference between projects implies xˆ1 = xˆ2 or s
σ
1 = s
σ
2 . That is,
σf1 + (1− σ)g1 = σf2 + (1− σ)g2
or
σ[f1 − g1 + g2 − f2] = g2 − g1.
Recall that f1 > g1 and g2 > f2, so the term multiplying σ is strictly positive. Hence
σ > 0 iff g2 > g1. Note that σ < 1 iff f1 > f2. This implies that we have a nondegenerate
mixed equilibrium iff either f1 > g2 > g1 > f2 or g2 > f1 > f2 > g1.
As mentioned above, there is a relationship between the “hitting for the fences” effect
and a riskiness effect. Specifically, with or without an assumption on whether one issue
is always harder than the other, we can compare F and G in terms of riskiness. We prove
the following result in Appendix D.
Theorem 9. G is strongly riskier than F iff f2 > max{g1, g2} ≥ min{g1, g2} > f1.
Of course, we can reverse the roles of F and G above to characterize when F is
strongly riskier than G.
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Comparing Theorems 8 and 9, we see that if issue 2 is the harder issue regardless of
the project, then G is the unique equilibrium and the strongly riskier project. Similarly, if
issue 1 is always the harder issue, then F is the unique equilibrium and the strongly riskier
project. On the other hand, if neither issue is always harder, then one of the projects is
riskier than the other, but the unique equilibrium has the agent mixing and thus putting
positive probability on the less risky project. For example, if f1 > g2 > g1 > f2, then G
is the strongly riskier project by Theorem 9. But Theorem 8 shows that there is a unique
mixed equilibrium in this case. Hence in this setting of partial disclosure, the conclusion
of Theorem 1 does not hold: G is strongly riskier than F but the agent chooses F with
positive probability in equilibrium. There is an inefficiency here in that we could slightly
worsen F or G and the agent will still put positive probability on both, but this is a
different inefficiency from the one discussed in Theorem 1.
8 Discussion
We conclude with some brief comments on omitted factors that might be of interest
to explore further. One natural factor to consider is the possibility of “noise” in the
disclosure process. It is natural to wonder if our results are robust to the possibility that
the evidence disclosed by either the agent or challenger is a noisy signal of x rather than
the realization x itself.
To see why one might suspect nonrobustness, consider the model where only the
agent may have evidence and suppose that there are two projects, F and G, where F
yields x = 2 with certainty and G gives x = 0 or x = 3, each with probability 1/2.
For any sufficiently small α and any q1 ∈ (0, 1), in the model without noise, it is never
an equilibrium for the agent to choose F . However, now suppose that the evidence the
agent might obtain in the disclosure stage is noisy. Specifically, suppose there is a set
of signals, say S, and that the distribution over signals received by the agent is a full
support distribution which depends on the true outcome. That is, if the true outcome is
x, then the distribution over signals is ψ(· | x) and this distribution has full support on
S for any x. Then it is always an equilibrium for the agent to choose F . If the observer
expects the agent to choose F , then he expects x to equal 2 and his belief will not change
regardless of the signal the agent shows him, if any. Hence the agent has no incentive to
deviate.
On the other hand, it is easy to see that this example relies critically on the degeneracy
of the chosen project. In fact, if we assume that all projects have the same support (that
is, the same set of possible outcomes), then the discontinuity at zero noise disappears.
To see this, think of the observer as having a prior belief about the outcome given by the
project he expects the agent to choose. For any full support “prior,” sufficiently precise
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signals will generate a posterior belief close to the true realization of the outcome. Thus if
all projects have the same support, the fact that the observer’s prior would be, in a sense,
wrong when the agent deviates will not prevent the observer from assigning probability
close to the 1 to the true outcome if the agent discloses a sufficiently precise signal.
Consequently, the set of equilibria for “small noise” and for “zero noise” will necessarily
be “close.”23 While our analysis is therefore robust with respect to small amounts of
noise under this full–support assumption, the introduction of noise may introduce new
issues and effects worth exploring.
Another direction to consider is to return to our discussion of transparency above and
consider the possibility that the agent can take actions which determine the probability
that he or the challenger receive evidence. There are a number of delicate modeling
questions here. Are the agent’s actions regarding transparency observable? If so, he may
have the ability to commit to a q1. In this case, at least if these actions are costless,
he would commit to q1 = 1 and achieve the first–best outcome.
24 If his actions aren’t
observable but are costless, he still has an incentive to choose q1 = 1 since this ensures
he can disclose if he wishes to do so. On the other hand, if his actions are unobserved
and costly, things are more complex, particularly if the challenger can also choose actions
which affect his probability of receiving evidence.
Finally, given the severe inefficiency of equilibria in this environment, it is natural to
ask whether players would find ways to improve the outcomes by some richer incentive
devices. In some cases, this seems difficult or impossible — e.g., in the voting example.
There it seems that the best one can do is to give equal access to information to the
challenger and incumbent (something that presumably a free press can help maintain).
In other environments, contracting may help. For example, suppose the agent is the
manager of a firm and the observer is the stock market. Then it seems natural to expect
the firm’s stockholders to alter the agent’s compensation in order to induce more efficient
behavior. Intuitively, the model implies that inefficiency results in part from the fact that
the manager’s payoff is increasing in the “short run” stock price — i.e., the stock price
before the outcome of the project is revealed to all. If his payoff instead depended only on
the “long run” stock price — i.e., the realization of x — the outcome would be first–best.
As has been noted in the literature,25 there are good reasons for expecting managerial
compensation to depend positively on both short–run and long–run stock prices. First,
if the long run is indeed long, the manager requires compensation in the short run too.
23It is worth noting that we could also add noise to the model in way which obviously has no effect on
our results. Specifically, suppose that the realized outcome is the signal drawn in the disclosure phase
(whether this is observed or not) plus an independent, mean zero, random variable. In this case, the
best estimate of the outcome conditional on the disclosure of a signal realization of x is simply x, so
none of our analysis changes at all. We thank Andy Skrzypacz for pointing this out.
24We thank David Kreps for pointing this out.
25See, for example, the discussion in Stein (1989) or Edmans, Heinle, and Huang (2013).
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Due to limited liability, it seems implausible that he can be forced to repay short–run
compensation if the realization of the project turns out to be poor in the long run. Second,
there is an issue as to whether stockholders can commit to not rewarding short–run stock
prices. To see the point, suppose that stockholders may need to sell their holdings in
the short run and hence care about the short–run stock price.26 If the manager has
positive news in the second period, then they would be better off at this point if he
would disclose it. Hence even if the original contract for the manager did not reward him
for a high short–run stock price, the stockholders would have an incentive to renegotiate
the contract after the project choice is made. Of course, if the manager anticipates this,
it is as if the original contract depended on the short–run price. Optimal contracting in
such an environment is a natural next step to consider.
26This formulation is common in the literature. See, for example, Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) or
Gigler, Kanodia, Sapra, and Venugopalan (2013).
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Appendix
A Proof of Theorem 2
Consider any game (F , α, q1, 0). Since the conclusion that R(0, 0, 0) = 0 was shown in
the text, we focus here only on nondegenerate games so either α > 0 or q1 > 0 (or both).
It is easy to see that R(1, q1, 0) = 1. If α = 1, the agent’s payoff from choosing F is
EF (x), independently of the strategy of the observer. Hence he must maximize this and
so his payoff must be the first–best. For the rest of this proof, assume α < 1.
It is also not hard to show that R(α, 1, 0) = 1. To see this, suppose q1 = 1 but we
have an equilibrium in which the agent’s payoff is strictly below the first–best. Then
the agent could deviate to any first–best project and always disclose the outcome. Since
q1 = 1, this ensures the agent a payoff equal to the first–best, a contradiction. Since
equilibria always exist, we see that R(α, 1, 0) = 1. For the rest of this proof, we assume
q1 < 1.
For a fixed xˆ, the agent’s payoff to choosing F is
αEF (x) + (1− α)[(1− q1)xˆ+ q1EF max{x, xˆ}]. (6)
As shown in the text, EF max{x, xˆ} = EF (x) +
∫ xˆ
0 F (x) dx, so we can rewrite this as
(α + (1− α)q1)EF (x) + (1− α)(1− q1)xˆ+ (1− α)q1
∫ xˆ
0
F (x) dx.
Fix an equilibrium mixed strategy for the agent σ and the associated xˆ. Let U =∑
F ′∈F σ(F ′)EF ′(x), so this is the agent’s expected payoff in the equilibrium. Let F be
any project in the support of the agent’s mixed strategy such that EF (x) ≤ U and let G
be any other feasible project. Then we must have
(α + (1− α)q1)EG(x) + (1− α)q1
∫ xˆ
0
G(x) dx
≤ (α + (1− α)q1)EF (x) + (1− α)q1
∫ xˆ
0
F (x) dx.
Since G(x) ≥ 0, this implies
(α + (1− α)q1)EG(x) ≤ (α + (1− α)q1)EF (x) + (1− α)q1
∫ xˆ
0
F (x) dx.
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Define z =
∫ xˆ
0 F (x) dx/xˆ. It is not hard to use equation (2) to show that q1 < 1 implies
xˆ > 0, so this is well–defined.27 Since F (x) ∈ [0, 1], we must have z ∈ [0, 1]. Then we
can rewrite this equation as
(α + (1− α)q1)EG(x) ≤ (α + (1− α)q1)EF (x) + (1− α)q1zxˆ. (7)
Since F is in the support of the agent’s equilibrium mixed strategy, we must have
(α + (1− α)q1)EF (x) + (1− α)(1− q1)xˆ+ (1− α)q1zxˆ = U,
so
xˆ =
U − (α + (1− α)q1)EF (x)
(1− α)[1− q1 + zq1] .
Substituting into equation (7) gives
(α + (1− α)q1)EG(x) ≤ (α + (1− α)q1)EF (x) + q1z
ñ
U − (α + (1− α)q1)EF (x)
1− q1 + zq1
ô
. (8)
Recall that U ≥ EF (x), so U ≥ (α + (1 − α)q1)EF (x). Hence q1 ≥ 0 implies that the
right–hand side is weakly increasing in z. Hence
(α + (1− α)q1)EG(x) ≤ (α + (1− α)q1)EF (x) + q1 [U − (α + (1− α)q1)EF (x)]
or
[α + (1− α)q1]EG(x) ≤ Uq1 + EF (x)(α + (1− α)q1)(1− q1).
Since the term multiplying EF (x) is positive, the fact that EF (x) ≤ U implies
(α + (1− α)q1)EG(x) ≤ U [q1 + (α + (1− α)q1)(1− q1)] .
Hence, taking G to be a first–best project,
U ≥ UFB
ñ
α + (1− α)q1
α + (1− α)q1(2− q1)
ô
.
To show that this bound is tight, consider the following example. Suppose F =
{F,G}. Assume F is a a distribution putting probability 1 − p on 0 and p on U/p, so
EF (x) = U , for some p ∈ (0, 1) and U > 0. Let G be a distribution putting probability
27To see this, suppose xˆ = 0. Then equation (2) implies that either q1 = 1 or EF (x) = 0 for all F in
the support of the agent’s mixed strategy. Since q1 < 1 by assumption, this implies U = 0. But this is
not possible. The agent can deviate to any project with a strictly positive mean (since there are at least
two projects, such a project must exist) and always show the outcome. Since either α > 0 or q1 > 0 or
both, the agent would gain by such a deviation.
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1 on x∗ for some x∗ > U . Note that EF (x) = U < x∗ = EG(x), so UFB = x∗. We
will characterize a situation where F is a pure strategy equilibrium and show that this
establishes the bound. Note that if F is chosen with probability 1 in equilibrium, then
we must have xˆ < U < x∗. Hence
∫ xˆ
0 G(x) dx = 0 and
∫ xˆ
0 F (x) dx = (1 − p)xˆ. Hence F
is optimal for the agent iff equation (7) holds at EG(x) = x
∗, EF (x) = U , and z = 1− p.
We can also solve for xˆ exactly as above with z = 1− p and EF (x) = U . Therefore, from
equation (8), this is an equilibrium iff
(α + (1− α)q1)x∗ ≤ U
ñ
α + (1− α)q1 + q1(1− p)
Ç
1− (α + (1− α)q1)
1− q1 + (1− p)q1
åô
.
Tedious algebra leads to
U ≥ x∗
Ç
(α + (1− α)q1)(1− q1 + (1− p)q1)
(α + (1− α)q1)(1− q1) + (1− p)q1
å
.
Fix p and choose x∗ so that this holds with equality. (It is immediate that the resulting
x∗ is necessarily larger than U , as assumed.) For p arbitrarily close to 0, we obtain an
example where
U ≈ UFB
Ç
α + (1− α)q1
(α + (1− α)q1)(1− q1) + q1
å
= UFB
Ç
α + (1− α)q1
α + (1− α)q1(2− q1)
å
.
Hence
R(α, q1, 0) =
α + (1− α)q1
α + (1− α)q1(2− q1) .
It is not hard to show that 1/R is concave in q1 and that the first–order condition for
maximization of 1/R holds uniquely at
q1 =
√
α
1 +
√
α
.
Thus R is uniquely minimized at this q1. Substituting this value of q1 into R and rear-
ranging yields
min
q1∈[0,1]
R(α, q1, 0) =
1 +
√
α
2
,
as asserted.
B Proof of Theorem 4
Again, nondegeneracy implies that either α > 0 or q2 > 0 or both. Just as in the proof
of Theorem 2, the result that we obtain the first–best when α = 1 is straightforward, so
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we assume throughout this proof that α < 1. The case of α = 0 is also straightforward.
To see this, suppose there is a distribution F ∈ F which is degenerate at 0. Suppose the
observer believes the agent chooses this distribution and the challenger never shows any
strictly positive x. Then since α = 0, no deviation by the agent can achieve a strictly
positive payoff. No matter what the agent does, the observer’s belief is that x = 0, so
the agent’s payoff is zero. Hence this is an equilibrium, establishing that R(0, 0, q2) = 0
for any q2. Hence for the rest of this proof, we assume α ∈ (0, 1).
Given that q1 = 0, we can write the agent’s payoff given xˆ and a choice of project F
as
αEF (x) + (1− α)(1− q2)xˆ+ (1− α)q2EF min{x, xˆ}.
Since EF min{x, xˆ} =
∫ xˆ
0 [1− F (x)] dx, we can rewrite this as
αEF (x) + (1− α)(1− q2)xˆ+ (1− α)q2
∫ xˆ
0
[1− F (x)] dx.
So fix an equilibrium mixed strategy for the agent σ and the associated xˆ. Again, let
U be the agent’s expected payoff — that is, U =
∑
F ′∈F σ(F ′)EF ′(x). Let F be a project
in the support of the agent’s mixed strategy satisfying EF (x) ≤ U and let G be any other
feasible project. Then we must have
αEG(x) + (1− α)q2
∫ xˆ
0
[1−G(x)] dx ≤ αEF (x) + (1− α)q2
∫ xˆ
0
[1− F (x)] dx.
Since G(x) ≤ 1, this implies
αEG(x) ≤ αEF (x) + (1− α)q2
∫ xˆ
0
[1− F (x)] dx.
Define z =
∫ xˆ
0 [1 − F (x)] dx/xˆ. One can use equation (2) and α > 0 to show that xˆ > 0
so this is well–defined.28 As in the proof of Theorem 2, F (x) ∈ [0, 1] implies z ∈ [0, 1].
Then we can rewrite this equation as
αEG(x) ≤ αEF (x) + (1− α)q2zxˆ. (9)
Because F is in the support of the agent’s equilibrium mixed strategy, we must have
αEF (x) + (1− α)(1− q2)xˆ+ (1− α)q2zxˆ = U,
28To see this, suppose xˆ = 0. From equation (2), this implies that∑
F ′∈F
σ(F ′)EF ′(x) = q2
∑
F ′∈F
σ(F ′)EF ′ min{x, 0} = 0.
Hence the agent’s mixed strategy must put probability 1 on a degenerate distribution at 0 and so U = 0.
Since α > 0, the agent can deviate to any other project (which must have a strictly positive mean) and
be strictly better off even if the challenger never discloses anything.
36
so
xˆ =
U − αEF (x)
(1− α)(1− q2 + zq2) .
Substituting into equation (9) gives
αEG(x) ≤ αEF (x) + q2z
ñ
U − αEF (x)
1− q2 + zq2
ô
. (10)
By assumption, U ≥ EF (x), so U ≥ αEF (x). Hence the right–hand side is weakly
increasing in z, so this implies
αEG(x) ≤ αEF (x) + q2 [U − αEF (x)]
or
αEG(x) ≤ q2U + α(1− q2)EF (x) ≤ U [q2 + α(1− q2)] = U [α + (1− α)q2].
Hence, taking G to be a first–best project,
U ≥ UFB
ñ
α
α + (1− α)q2
ô
.
To see that the bound is tight, let F be a degenerate distribution at x∗ and suppose
we have an equilibrium where the agent chooses F . Clearly, then, xˆ = U = x∗. Let G
put probability 1 − p on 0 and p on y/p where y > x∗ for some p ∈ (0, 1). Note that
EG(x) = y. Assume F and G are the only feasible projects. Then this is an equilibrium
if
αy + (1− α)q2[(1− p)(0) + pxˆ] ≤ (α + (1− α)q2)xˆ.
Since xˆ = U , we can rewrite this as
αy ≤ U [α + (1− α)(1− p)q2] .
Fix any p ∈ (0, 1) and choose y so that this holds with equality. Since the resulting y
satisfies y ≥ U , we have UFB = y. So this gives an example where
U = UFB
ñ
α
α + (1− α)(1− p)q2
ô
.
As p ↓ 0, the right–hand side converges to α/[α+(1−α)q2]. Hence we can get arbitrarily
close to the stated bound, so
R(α, 0, q2) =
α
α + (1− α)q2 .
The last two statements of the theorem follow directly.
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C Comparative Statics Example
Suppose there are three feasible projects, F1, F2, and F3. Project Fi gives a “high
outcome” hi with probability pi and a “low outcome” `i otherwise. The specific values
of hi, `i, and pi are given in the table below.
hi `i pi µi
F1 964 532 1/2 748
F2 5904/7 0 7/8 738
F3 1737/2 171 4/5 729
In the table, µi = EFi(x). Note that F1 is the first–best project, F2 is second best,
and F3 worst. Simple calculations show the range of α’s for which it is a pure strategy
equilibrium for the agent to choose Fi for each i. For each of the three projects, there
is a nonempty range of α’s where it is chosen in equilibrium. Similarly, for each pair of
projects, there is a nonempty range of α’s where that pair is the support of the agent’s
mixed strategy.
In the case where the agent randomizes between projects F1 and F2 or between F1 and
F3, the agent’s equilibrium payoff decreases with α. On the other hand, the equilibrium
payoff when the agent randomizes between F2 and F3 is increasing in α.
To see the intuition, consider the case where the agent randomizes between F1 and
F2. As α increases, if xˆ is fixed, the agent would switch to F1 since he now cares more
about the outcome of the project and F1 has the higher expected outcome. So xˆ must
adjust to deter this deviation. Which way do we need to adjust xˆ to make the agent
indifferent again? Note that F2 has a much higher chance of having a good outcome to
show than F1. Thus if xˆ declines, this pushes the agent toward F2. Hence the adjustment
that restores indifference is reducing xˆ. To reduce xˆ, we must make the observer more
pessimistic about the outcome. This means we must reduce the probability that the
agent picks F1, lowering the agent’s equilibrium payoff. Similarly, note that F3 gives its
high outcome with higher probability than F1, so similar intuition applies here. On the
other hand, in comparing F2 and F3, it is F2, the better of the two projects, which has
the higher chance of the high outcome. Hence the opposite holds in this case.
The figure below shows the equilibrium payoffs as a function of α. Note that, as
asserted, the equilibrium payoffs for two of the three mixed strategy equilibria are de-
creasing in α. Note also that the payoff to the worst equilibrium is decreasing in α for
α between 1/4 and 1/3. Finally, note that if we focus only on pure strategy equilib-
ria, the worst equilibrium payoff is decreasing in α as we move from the range where
α ∈ [5/24, 1/3] to α > 1/3.
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α
1
5
5
24
1
4
4
15
1
3
F3
729
F1
748
F1 + F3
741
F1 + F2
738
F2
F2 + F3
Figure 3: Equilibrium Payoffs
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D Proof of Theorem 9
Project F corresponds to the distribution that puts probability (1 − f1)(1 − f2) on 0,
f1f2 on 2, and f1 + f2 − 2f1f2 on 1. We write the probability F puts on i successes as
f(i) and analogously for G. So ∫ z
0
F (x) dx >
∫ z
0
G(x) dx
for all z ∈ (0, 2) iff f(0) > g(0) and
f(0) + (z − 1)[f(0) + f(1)] > g(0) + (z − 1)[g(0) + g(1)],∀z ∈ (1, 2). (11)
Note that∫ 2
0
F (x) dx = 2f(0) + f(1) = 2[1− f(1)− f(2)] + f(1) = 2− EF (x).
Since F and G are assumed to have equal means, this implies that we have an equality
in equation (11) at z = 2. Hence equation (11) holds iff f(0) > g(0).
Hence F is strongly riskier than G if
1− f1 − f2 + f1f2 > 1− g1 − g2 + g1g2.
By equal means, f1 + f2 = g1 + g2, so this holds iff
f1f2 > g1(f1 + f2 − g1)
iff
(f1 − g1)(f2 − g1) > 0.
By assumption, f1 > g1, so this holds iff f2 > g1. Given equal means, this holds iff
g2 > max{f1, f2} ≥ min{f1, f2} > g1.
The case where G is strongly riskier is analogous.
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